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The Unnecessary and Restrictive Constitutional 
Amendments Concerning Religious Freedom in 
Mexico 
Javier Saldaña Serrano*  
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most widely publicized constitutional reforms in 
recent times has been that concerning Articles 24 and 40 of the 
Mexican Constitution. In Article 24, a number of changes were made 
that purport to broaden the scope of protection to religious freedom 
in Mexico.1 In Article 40, the term “secular” was incorporated as one 
of the essential characteristics of the Republic.2 
It should be noted that Article 24 of the Constitution has not 
been altered since 1992, the year it underwent important 
amendments,3 and Article 40 has not changed since 1917; in fact, it 
came without any modification from the 1857 Constitution.4 
 
 * Researcher at the Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas (Institute of Legal Research) at 
the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM) (National Autonomous University of 
Mexico). 
 1. See Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, art. 24, 
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.). 
 2. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, art. 40, 
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.), available at 
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/ref/dof/CPEUM_ref_205_30nov12.pdf. 
 3. In 1992, Article 24 underwent various reforms. First, the reference to practicing acts 
of worship “in temples or in private domiciles” was deleted from the first paragraph. The 
current second paragraph was also introduced, which did not exist before and prohibits 
Congress from establishing or prohibiting any religion. Finally, the former second paragraph 
became the third and was left as we understand it today. To see these changes, compare 
Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], Diario Oficial de la Federación 
[DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.) with Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos 
[C.P.], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 28 de Enero de 1992 (Mex.). 
 4. Article 40 of the Constitution of 1857 said: “It is the will of the Mexican people to be 
constituted in a representative, democratic, federal republic, comprised of free States, sovereign 
in all things that concern their internal affairs, but united in a federation established according 
to the principles of this fundamental law.” FELIPE TENA RAMÍREZ, LEYES FUNDAMENTALES DE 
MÉXICO, 1808–1999 at 613 (20th ed. 1997). 
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The text of Article 24, before the amendment, stated the 
following: 
 Every man is free to practice the religious belief that most 
pleases him and to practice the ceremonies, devotions, or acts of his 
respective faith, provided they do not constitute a crime or offense 
punishable by law. 
 Congress may not make laws that establish or prohibit any 
religion. 
 Religious acts of a sect are ordinarily conducted in houses of 
worship. Those that are extraordinarily conducted outside of these 
will be subject to the regulation of law.5 
In turn, Article 40 stated: “It is the will of the Mexican people to 
be constituted in a representative, democratic, federal republic, 
comprised of free States, sovereign in all things that concern their 
internal affairs, but united in a federation established according to 
the principles of this fundamental law.”6 
After the constitutional amendments of March 2012, the texts of 
these articles are as follows. Article 24 now reads: 
Every person has the right to freedom of ethical convictions, of 
conscience, and of religion, and to have or adopt, as is appropriate, 
those of his choice. This freedom includes the right to participate, 
individually or collectively, publicly or privately, in the 
corresponding ceremonies, devotions, or acts of worship, provided 
they do not constitute a crime or offense punishable by law. No one 
may use public acts in exercise of this freedom for political 
purposes, for proselytizing, or for political propaganda.7 
The last two paragraphs of Article 24 were not modified. 
 
 5. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], art. 24, Diario Oficial 
de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.). Article 24 was amended in 1992, as 
articulated in Decreto por el que se Reforman los Artículos 3, 5, 24, 27, 130 y se Adiciona el 
Artículo Decimoséptimo Transitorio de las Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos 
Mexicanos [Decree to Reform Articles 3, 5, 24, 27, 130 and to Add Article 17 Provisional of the 
Political Constitution of the United States of Mexico], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 28 
de Enero de 1992 (Mex.), available at http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/ 
ref/dof/CPEUM_ref_121_28ene92_ima.pdf. 
 6. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], art. 40, Diario Oficial 
de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.); RAMÍREZ, supra note 4. 
 7. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, art. 24, 
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.). 
DO NOT DELETE 1/29/2014 10:02 AM 
553 Unnecessary and Restrictive Constitutional Amendments in Mexico 
 555 
In turn, Article 40 reads: “It is the will of the Mexican people to 
be constituted in a representative, democratic, secular, federal 
republic, comprised of free States, sovereign in all things that 
concern their internal affairs, but united in a federation established 
according to the principles of this fundamental law.”8 
The sections set forth below will attempt to answer the following 
questions. Is it true that the amendments to Article 24 extend 
protections of human rights, specifically protection of religious 
freedom, as was adamantly indicated at the time?9 Was it necessary 
to incorporate the Republic’s secularism into the Mexican 
Constitution? Ultimately, what benefits will both constitutional 
amendments bring to Mexican citizens? 
Answers to these questions will be given through ten very 
specific arguments. From this point onward, this Article’s attention 
will be fixed primarily on the content of Article 24. Although the 
Author makes some comments about Article 40, he leaves a more 
detailed analysis of it for another article. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. 
The first pertinent observation is that, when examined closely, 
all of the content in Article 24 before the reform had an essential 
purpose to establish the right of religious freedom; in other words, 
any citizen or legal scholar knew perfectly well that this provision 
protected the fundamental right of religious freedom. Now, after the 
 
 8. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, art. 40, 
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.). 
 9. The alleged extension of rights was one of the main arguments that was brandished 
to pass the amendment. As just one example, then-Senator Melquiades Morales Flores upon 
taking the floor during the discussion said: 
It is certain that our Magna Carta [Constitution] recognizes and protects religious 
freedom, but it does not contemplate the freedom of ethical convictions or of 
conscience. This is why it is necessary to elevate these rights to constitutional status, 
for as we expand the universe of human rights in our legislation, we will be 
answering and fulfilling the struggles and aspirations of Mexicans to obtain these 
rights. 
Versión estenográfica de la sesión ordinaria del Senado, del miércoles 28 de marzo de 2012, Primera parte 
[Transcript of the Regular Meeting of the Senate, on Wednesday, March 28, 2012, Part One] 
(Mex.), available at http://200.33.232.136/index.php/periodo-ordinario/versiones/3370-version-
estenografica-de-la-sesion-ordinaria-del-senado-del-miercoles-28-de-marzo-de-
2012.html?start=1. 
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constitutional reform, Article 24 contains not only this right, but it 
has also permanently included (under very questionable legal 
drafting) two more rights and freedoms: (1) freedom of “ethical 
convictions,” and (2) freedom of “conscience.” With these changes, 
there is no longer one right or freedom included in this single 
normative provision, but three. 
Although at first glance this may not raise any problems, and 
may be considered something superficial, it creates at least two 
immediate problems, one considerably minor and one of greater 
magnitude. The first is that in defining the rights in question, it 
would have been convenient not to include three freedoms in one 
paragraph, but to recognize each of these in at least three different 
paragraphs. This might have helped to avoid the problems and errors 
that will be presented throughout this Article. 
The greater problem essentially concerns the exercise, and 
eventual protection, of the rights in question. Formerly, if Article 24 
was invoked for protection, it was known that this concerned the 
right to religious freedom. Now, if the same provision is pled, is it a 
request to protect the right to religious freedom or all three rights?10 
At first glance, it could be said that this question can be resolved by 
focusing on the specific facts of each case, but the solution is not so 
simple. For example, how does one solve the problem of a 
manifestation of a civil society that proclaims and defends atheism or 
secularism? Will this practice be protected by freedom of conscience, 
freedom of ethical convictions, or freedom of religion? 
When the text of Article 24 stated that every man was free to 
practice the religious belief that most pleased him and to practice the 
ceremonies, devotions, or acts of his respective faith, it was clear 
that this referred to religious freedom. However, in the previous 
example, how would we differentiate this freedom from the other 
two? Perhaps such demonstrations in favor of atheism or secularism 
 
 10. This is the problem that Mendoza Enrique Delgado seems to point out, noting: 
The project—which refers to the draft that amends Article 24 and which is now being 
discussed as part of the States of the Republic (JSS)—is confusing, because the good 
that Article 24 protects is the freedom to adjust one’s own behavior to one’s beliefs, 
or practice certain acts outwardly; this is what is meant by professing . . . . This is 
now foggy and will require further clarification in the context of human rights 
recognized by the Constitution itself. 
Enrique Mendoza Delgado, Diálogo entre legisladores y sociedad civil, in REFORMAS AL 24 
CONSTITUCIONAL, CUATRO ENFOQUES 26 (2012). 
DO NOT DELETE 1/29/2014 10:02 AM 
553 Unnecessary and Restrictive Constitutional Amendments in Mexico 
 557 
would be expressions of “ceremonies, devotions, or acts of . . . 
faith” as stated in Article 24.11 
Similarly, believing that such a manifestation could be covered 
by either of the other two freedoms—that is, by ethical convictions 
or conscience—would entail an even greater problem to religious 
freedom because no distinctive feature clearly establishes the 
difference between protecting religious freedom and protecting 
secularism under freedom of ethical belief or of conscience. This, as 
is clearly shown, is confusing. 
Thus, we can conclude from this first argument that the 
constitutional reform not only creates confusion by establishing 
three different freedoms within one normative provision, but, even 
worse, it blurs the purpose of protecting the right that it purportedly 
safeguarded. This blurring creates greater difficulty concerning the 
secondary regulation of this normative provision. What would a 
future regulatory law concerning Article 24 be called? The Statutory 
Law of the Freedom of Ethical Convictions, Conscience, and 
Religion? 
B. 
In connection with the above problem, part of the amended 
Article 24 expressly provides, “[t]his freedom includes . . . .”12 In so 
doing, it literally refers to just one freedom, when it earlier 
announced that there were three: freedom of (1) ethical convictions, 
(2) conscience, and (3) religion. The obvious question, then, is 
whether these constitute just one freedom or three different 
freedoms. If these are just one freedom—as the constitutional 
amendment expressly reads today—what was the purpose of 
previously announcing this freedom in three different ways? Or if 
they are three different freedoms, why refer to them by the phrase, 
“[t]his freedom includes . . . .”? It is evident that the Mexican 
legislature did not have a clear idea of what it was protecting 
because, as the text reads, it is unclear whether it wanted to expand 
the list of rights and freedoms or just put more emphasis on one of 
these. This not only reveals inadequate and poor legislative 
drafting—grievous when on a constitutional level—but it also shows 
 
 11. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, art. 24, 
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.). 
 12. Id. 
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a lack of even minimal attention to what is being done when drafting 
a provision of such importance. 
We must remember that one of the main tasks of jurisprudence 
and of legislative drafting is to distinguish with clarity and accuracy 
the different rights dealt with, indicating their typical or specific 
characters, their limits, their nature, etc. This is necessary to avoid 
confusing some rights with others, to not superimpose some rights 
on others, and to not identify some rights as breeds of others—a 
confusion that is happening now under the constitutional reform. 
This requirement is even more important when such rights are set 
forth in the supreme text of any fairly developed state, like a 
constitutional government. Therefore, it is necessary to establish 
that, from the actual wording of Article 24, it is not clear what might 
be the typical characteristics that could help us clearly differentiate 
among the freedoms of ethical convictions, conscience, and religion. 
It is true that constitutional doctrine, concerning topics like the 
specialties of human rights and religion law, does not have a 
universally accepted definition for each of these three freedoms, but 
a part of constitutional doctrine has been responsible for establishing 
the typical characteristics of these freedoms, indicating the specific 
contours of these freedoms and how to understand their 
uniqueness.13 This is not the place to detail such characterization, 
but beginning such an exercise is well worth doing, even if it is only 
a general characterization. 
Under this doctrine, if we consider that ethical convictions are an 
expression of freedom of thought (as a portion of Mexican legal 
doctrine has recognized),14 this freedom encompasses beliefs (not 
religious), ideas, or opinions of any kind, and, therefore, its typical 
 
 13. See JAVIER HERVADA, LOS ECLESIASTICISTAS ANTE UN ESPECTADOR 183–224 (1993) 
[hereinafter HERVADA, LOS ECLESIASTICISTAS]. Before this work, Professor Hervada had also 
published another article in which he discussed the same topic. See Javier Hervada, Libertad de 
conciencia y error sobre la moralidad de una terapéutica, in PERSONA Y DERECHO 11, 13–53 (1984) 
[hereinafter Hervada, Libertad de conciencia], available at 
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&ved=0C
DUQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdspace.unav.es%2Fdspace%2Fbitstream%2F10171%2F12442
%2F1%2FPD_11_01.pdf&ei=Pm81Ufb5IIedqQH5r4CQCA&usg=AFQjCNH-
OxorUEL9KxFqhdgcRNVTJZmUdw&sig2=q7tr52aiCuzOcXCylqmSjw&bvm=bv.43148975,d.a
WM. This earlier work is what we follow in this Article. 
 14. Jorge Adame Goddard, El proyecto de reformas del artículo 24 constitucional sobre libertad 
religiosa, in REFORMAS AL 24 CONSTITUCIONAL, CUATRO ENFOQUES 15 (2012), available at 
http://es.catholic.net/sexualidadybioetica/371/942/articulo.php?id=53509. 
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characteristic would be intellectual activity in search of truth or the 
adoption of views relating to philosophy, culture, science, politics, 
art, recreation, etc.15 
On the other hand, the subject of freedom of conscience is 
distinct from freedom of ethical convictions, and many theorists who 
refer to freedom of conscience have maintained this distinction.16 
The freedom of conscience consists of acting according to the 
dictates or judgments of practical reason, according to the morality 
of an action that was performed, is being performed, or will be 
performed.17 Therefore, its purpose pertains specifically to those 
moral judgments to which man must conform his actions without 
being subject to any type of coercion or influence.18 
Finally, freedom of religion can be distinguished from the other 
two freedoms because its purpose is different. This freedom’s 
purpose is religion, and therefore it embodies the relations that men 
establish with God in free manner or, in other words, without any 
type of coercion through various external or public demonstrations, 
among other things, and where the State is incompetent.19 The 
distinctive feature to consider in this characterization is the idea of 
God as “that transcendent—not human—reality that implies a 
certain conception and interpretation of all existence and of life 
itself, so that this conception, transformed into doctrine, also 
determines one’s behavior through the demands of a particular 
moral.”20 
 
 15. See Hervada, Libertad de conciencia, supra note 13, at 35–37. 
 16. An example of this understanding that freedom of conscience and its purpose are 
distinct from the freedom of thought and religion can be seen in Jesús Bogarín Díaz, Contribución 
a la construcción de un concepto autónomo de libertad de conciencia, in EL DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO A LAS 
PUERTAS DEL SIGLO XXI: LIBRO HOMENAJE AL PROFESOR JUAN GOTI ORDEÑANA 36–38 (2006), 
available at https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad= 
rja&ved=0CDUQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdialnet.unirioja.es%2Fservlet%2Farticulo%3Fco
digo%3D2302947&ei=8nA1UY_rPMeoqgG_qICQBg&usg=AFQjCNGpqxCJMofQY3c36-UhRe-
9JakSlQ&sig2=0hyt0hKLdPYNtfgHwAs1xw&bvm=bv.43148975,d.aWM. 
 17. See Hervada, Libertad de conciencia, supra note 13, at 41–46. 
 18. Although ideas with different nuances exist, this is the majority opinion in specialized 
doctrine concerning the freedom of conscience and is sustained by Jesús Bogarín Díaz. Díaz, 
supra note 16, at 37–49. 
 19. See HERVADA, Libertad de conciencia, supra note 13, at 38–41. 
 20. Joaquín Mantecón, La libertad religiosa como derecho humano, in TRATADO DE DERECHO 
ECLESIÁSTICO 88 (1994). A very detailed analysis of the different ways of defining “religion” can 
be found in BRETT G. SCHARFFS & W. COLE DURHAM, LAW AND RELIGION: NATIONAL, 
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 39–48 (2010), available at 
http://www.aspenlawschool.com/books/durhamscharffs/default.asp. 
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This distinction, or some kind of effort to classify freedom of 
religion, may have helped to distinguish the original freedom from 
the new freedoms that were introduced in that constitutional 
reform,21 but this did not happen. Instead, the three referenced 
freedoms are mentioned after this introduction: “This freedom 
includes . . . .” Is this not patently incongruent? 
In light of this second argument, it can be concluded that the 
constitutional amendment at issue is confusing, because its own 
writing does not say whether Article 24 protects three different 
freedoms—as the article initially states—or just one freedom—as it 
expressly notes later. In accordance with correct legislative drafting 
and the most basic legal knowledge, these should have been 
established in different paragraphs, to indicate that they were three 
different freedoms. Also, they should not have been confusingly 
referred to later as just one freedom. 
C. 
In line with what we have discussed, a third observation raises 
an issue of equal importance. It has to do with the question of 
whether the freedoms of ethical convictions, conscience, and 
religion—now included in the Constitution—really are human 
rights, or whether they are mere inventions drawn from anti-
religious legislative ideology (specifically anti-Catholic), legislators’ 
ignorance, or partisan political convenience of those who voted on 
the amendment. Thus, it is necessary to investigate whether there is 
a legal reference that fairly confirms that these are human rights and 
not an improvisation. 
This question could be seen as absurd in this day and age, but it 
is not, especially because we live in a time characterized by an 
increasingly frequent and casual tendency to call everything “human 
rights.” Today more than ever, it is appropriate to pause and refer to 
positive law and from there to ask what rights exist, and whether the  
 
 
 21. This effort to distinguish has also been made in Mexican doctrine where a 
differentiation between the freedoms of thought, conscience, and religion is generally accepted. 
See Eugenia del Carmen Diez Hidalgo, Desafíos actuales de la libertad religiosa en México a la luz de 
los derechos humanos, in UNA PUERTA ABIERTA A LA LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA: (MÉXICO A QUINCE AÑOS 
DE LAS REFORMAS CONSTITUCIONALES EN MATERIA RELIGIOSA 1992-2007) at 35–136 (2007). 
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rights to these announced freedoms have been recognized as such in 
any document. 
One answer would be that in the case of the rights to freedom of 
conscience and religion, we can quickly confirm that these truly are 
human rights. We can look to any constitution or international 
treaty that protects these rights to confirm this. However, can we say 
the same about the freedom of ethical convictions? The answer to 
this would not be nearly as clear. 
Skepticism about whether this freedom, now introduced into the 
Mexican Constitution, is or is not a human right is based on two 
arguments. The first is that Mexican constitutional history does not 
contain a single reference, express or implied, to this right. In other 
words, none of the constitution’s texts has recognized in its list of 
rights the right of ethical convictions. To clarify, this law has simply 
never existed in Mexican constitutional history. 
This problem can also be confirmed if we move it into the 
international arena. Here, there is no record that the freedom of 
ethical convictions has been recognized as a fundamental right in any 
of the international documents protecting human rights.  
If ethical convictions are not found as a right in Mexican 
constitutional history, and if it has not had place in the long list of 
international documents protecting human rights, what is the origin 
of this right? What does this new right mean? Now, if its meaning is 
unknown, what did the legislature want to protect by including it in 
the Constitution? It must be clearly recognized that this “new” right 
to freedom of ethical convictions was invented by the Mexican 
legislature. No one knows for sure from where the legislature 
extracted this right.22 
Thus, freedom of ethical convictions is foreign to the national 
and international culture of human rights. What does an expression 
so confusing and ambiguous as ethical convictions mean? What is 
the legal status of this freedom? Has a national or international court 
spoken concerning this right? Is there any hermeneutic reference 
that helps us know how to interpret it? If the answer to these 
 
 22. Laporta has discussed the problem of including “new” rights, noting that it is quite 
reasonable to assume “that the more the list of human rights is multiplied, the less force these 
rights demand, and the more legal or moral power these rights are presumed to have, the more 
limited ought to be the list of rights that adequately justify this list.” Francisco Laporta, Sobre el 
concepto de derechos humanos, in DOXA 4 at 23 (1987), available at 
http://www.bioetica.org/cuadernos/bibliografia/laporta.pdf. 
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questions is no, reasons for including this right in the constitutional 
text should have been given, but none are provided. At most, what 
has been argued is that this freedom “guaranteed the rights of 
nonbelievers—agnostic and atheists.” But if this were the case, then 
the situation would become even worse given the ignorance of the 
Mexican legislature. We all know that if something is characterized 
by religious freedom—and in general any public freedom—it is 
precisely because it is primarily a freedom from coercion or, in other 
words, a freedom from imposing a particular religion or religious 
belief. The Mexican legislature should study and better understand 
religious freedom before proposing far-reaching constitutional 
amendments such as Article 24. 
Expanding on the previous point, it should be remembered that 
while religious freedom protects the relationship that man 
establishes with God, this includes more than just protecting 
affirmative acts of adhering to this divinity. It means that every man 
should be prevented from exercising any kind of pressure on how 
others worship God or choose not to.23 With this understanding, if 
the Mexican legislature intended to protect atheists and agnostics so 
that religious beliefs were not imposed on them, this safeguard was 
already included in religious freedom. Therefore, it was unnecessary 
to invent a new right like ethical convictions to protect those with no 
religion. 
The second argument against the new right of ethical convictions 
deals with the question of which ethical convictions are protected by 
the constitutional amendment. Does this include all ethical 
convictions that are observed in a pluralistic society? If not, which 
ones will and will not actually be protected? And if some are 
defended and some are not, what criteria will determine which are 
and which are not? The author fears that the final answer to these 
questions will necessarily lead us to confirm that the political powers 
will give the final say. In other words, the current government will 
determine what ethical convictions will and will not be covered. But 
accepting this leaves a wide margin of discretion to political 
authorities, needlessly risking observance and respect for human 
rights. History has shown that leaving the door open to the 
discretion of any political authority places before us a totalitarian 
 
 23. See Hervada, Libertad de conciencia, supra note 13, at 40. 
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and dictatorial regime, which has occurred more than once in 
Mexico. 
The conclusion of this third argument seems clear. Ethical 
convictions, which are claimed to be a new human right, have never 
been recognized as such, not in the long history of the Mexican 
Constitution nor in any of the existing documents that protect 
human rights. This justifiably leads to theoretical skepticism, not 
only because of this phrase’s enigmatic meaning but also and 
especially because of its uncertain legal status. 
D. 
In the same line of argument as above, there is another comment 
that should be made concerning the term ethical convictions, which 
may be more serious and sensitive than those made thus far. 
The fact that the Mexican legislature has established in only one 
article both the freedom of ethical convictions and the freedom of 
religion, legally integrates both freedoms and, as a result, their 
respective purposes. In other words, by this inclusion, the Mexican 
legislature (consciously or not) placed any ethical belief (the 
purposes of this freedom) on equal footing with religion (the 
purpose of the right to religious freedom). Frankly, this brings 
dangerous consequences. 
First, it should be noted that when we speak of ethical 
convictions, this is not just one conviction—or a few ethical 
currents—but a huge variety of convictions, all of which have 
different manifestations and foundations. Certainly it can be said 
that throughout the history of moral philosophy there have been as 
many moral conceptions as thinkers that have addressed these 
ethical convictions.24 Of the vast universe of ethical convictions, 
which are covered under this constitutional amendment? 
As just one example, let’s consider hedonism, which is a moral 
theory that consists mainly of the pursuit of happiness through the 
 
 24. One of the most important works in Spanish that has been written explaining in 
detail the different ethical conceptions throughout history is that of Professor Victoria Camps. 1, 
2, 3 VICTORIA CAMPS, HISTORIA DE LA ÉTICA (1999), available at 
http://www.planetadelibros.com/historia-de-la-etica-voliii-libro-17069.html. Another excellent 
work is the more recent work edited by Carlos Gómez and Javier Muguerza. LA AVENTURA DE LA 
MORALIDAD: PARADIGMAS, FRONTERAS Y PROBLEMAS DE LA ÉTICA (Javier Muguerza & Carlos Gómez 
eds., 2007), available at http://www.casadellibro.com/libro-la-aventura-de-la-moralidad-
paradigmas-fronteras-y-problemas-de-la-etica/9788420648729/1159686. 
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satisfaction of bodily pleasures, among other means.25 Is bodily joy 
and pleasure on the same level as a spiritual relationship with God? 
Ultimately, what underlies this proposal is identifying any ethical 
belief—or way of seeing the world—with religion or one’s 
relationship with God. This not only supports giving ethical 
convictions equal value, but more significantly it brings about an 
unavoidable consequence: moral and obviously religious relativism. 
What appears again is the uncompromising and anti-religious spirit 
of the times. The theoretical and practical consequences of this 
ideological secularism are particularly serious, and we should be 
aware of these, not only to avoid confusion, but above all to better 
protect and safeguard rights. Here are some cases of both 
consequences. 
With regard to the theoretical consequences, it must be said that 
the foretold equalization raises in the background a renunciation of 
truth—in this case religious truth. But history has taught us that 
religion (the subject of religious freedom) always respects truth, not 
the ideology of any ethical conviction. It is very difficult to think that 
religions such as Islam, Judaism, or Christianity present themselves 
as mere ethical convictions, since they consider themselves to be 
repositories of truth. 
In this sense, religious freedom does not mean indifference, as 
opposed to what is necessary and which is not free. This definition 
appears to present circular reasoning, when considering that the 
human intellect is unable to grasp reality as a whole and, therefore, 
truth on a religious plane. Based on these theoretical reasons, it is 
not possible to equalize an alleged freedom of ethical convictions 
with the right to religious freedom. 
The practical consequences are equally significant because they 
concern nothing less than the protection of the rights of the 
freedom. Placing the freedom of ethical convictions on equal footing 
with religious freedom would lead to legal absurdities, like equating 
the refusal to serve in the military on pacifist motives (an ethical 
conviction) with religious reasons of not killing. Are these exactly 
the same? In the same sense, does a person who refuses to eat meat 
due to ethical convictions (naturalism) merit the same consideration 
 
 25. “The beginning and the end of human life, that is, happiness consists of bodily 
pleasure.” F. BLÁZQUEZ CARMONA, AGUSTÍN DEVESA DEL PRADO & MARIANO CANO GALINDO, 
DICCIONARIO DE TÉRMINOS ÉTICOS 257 (1999). 
DO NOT DELETE 1/29/2014 10:02 AM 
553 Unnecessary and Restrictive Constitutional Amendments in Mexico 
 565 
as a person such as a Jew or Muslim who does not eat certain species 
for strictly religious motives? Is it the same to not eat meat for the 
consideration and love of other animals as for obedience to God? 
This Article contends that this is not the same, which is the problem 
that comes from equalizing the two. 
As has been shown, equalization between ethical convictions and 
religious freedom, or rather between the purposes of the two 
freedoms, brings very significant problems to human rights, but this 
did not matter in the least to the Mexican legislature, which 
introduced a new freedom that did not seem sufficiently 
contemplated. 
The concluding reasoning in this fourth argument is obvious: 
placing the freedom of ethical convictions and religious freedom on 
an equal plane clearly poses two kinds of problems, some theoretical 
and others of a practical nature. Concerning the former problems, 
the idea of renouncing religious truth and promoting moral and 
religious relativism is presented, in the best case, as a request that 
would at least initially merit a tremendous rational discussion before 
being accepted without restriction. The practical problems are also 
evident, because until now it has been clear that protecting rights for 
religious reasons is very different from protecting rights based on a 
particular worldview. 
E. 
Another consequence derived from this lack of clarity that the 
term ethical convictions generates is that some authors have 
considered its inclusion in the Mexican Constitution unnecessary 
because freedom of ethical convictions relates to freedom of thought, 
which was already protected by Article 6.26 For example, authors 
like Jorge Adame argue that “[t]he freedom to manifest these ideas 
necessarily implies the inner freedom to conceive and assent to these 
ideas, so that the freedom to have ethical convictions and manifest 
them publicly was already recognized by the Constitution, and there 
was no need to include it in Article 24.”27 
This point coincides with part of the specialized Spanish doctrine 
regarding ecclesiastical law, which points out that these convictions 
 
 26. Goddard, supra note 14, at 15; Gerardo Cruz González, La libertad religiosa en la 
Constitución de México a debate, in REFORMAS AL 24 CONSTITUCIONAL, CUATRO ENFOQUES 36 (2012). 
 27. Goddard, supra note 14, at 15. 
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are a “system of ideas and judgments that a person forms about 
things and that lets him or her act as a rational being in compliance with his 
or her natural purposes, whether of a personal nature or of a social 
nature.”28 
Indeed, those that believe this definition are correct. The very 
meaning of the term “conviction” tells us that this is an idea to 
which a person strongly adheres.29 However, we must remember 
that in addition to nonreligious convictions or ideas that are set forth 
and protected in Article 6 of the Constitution, often people’s deepest 
convictions are religious in nature (those for which they are capable 
of performing great personal sacrifices and offering even their own 
lives). Thus, it seems repetitive and unnecessary to amend Article 24 
of the Constitution not only because this right was already found in 
Article 6 (as noted by the aforementioned authors), but because 
Article 24 itself already contained it by recognizing one’s religious 
convictions. Consequently, it was understandably unnecessary to 
include this “new” right of ethical convictions in the constitutional 
amendment.30 
To avoid this unnecessary repetition, the national legislature 
should have followed, as it seems was its intent, the typology of 
various international documents that protect human rights and that 
contain the three rights of quintessential freedoms, for example, 
Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,31 
 
 28. Hervada, Libertad de consciencia, supra note 13, at 35; see also Mantecón, supra note 20, 
at 110; IVÁN C. IBÁN & LUIS PRIETO SANCHÍS, LECCIONES DE DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO 141 (2d ed. 
1990) (emphasis added). 
 29. See REAL ACADEMIA ESPAÑOLA, DICCIONARIO DE LA LENGUA ESPAÑOLA 438 (22nd ed. 
2001). 
 30. In case the above discussion is not sufficient, it should also be noted that apart from 
the Mexican Constitution, those rights (thought, conscience, and religion) were already 
recognized in more than one international document signed by Mexico that deals with and 
protects human rights. Therefore, the amendment was not only unnecessary but also repetitive 
for yet another reason. We must not forget that in 2011 Mexico amended its Constitution, 
recognizing greater protection of the fundamental rights set out in international documents that 
protect human rights. For an analysis of the constitutional amendment to Article I of the 
Mexican Constitution and the manner in which international documents concerning human 
rights should be interpreted, see Juan Díaz Romero & Juan Nepomuceno Silva Meza, Comentarios 
a las reformas constitucionales de 2011 sobre derecho humanos y juicio de amparo, in 10 ENSAYOS Y 
CONFERENCIAS DE LOS FORJADORES DE LA SUPREMA CORTE DE JUSTICIA DE LA NACIÓN 39 (2012). 
 31. Article 18 says: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or 
in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, 
practice, worship and observance.” 1 JAVIER HERVADA & JOSÉ M. ZUMAQUERO, TEXTOS 
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Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
of 1966,32 or Articles 12 and 13 of the Pact of San José, Costa Rica of 
1969.33 The second document says: “Everyone shall have the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion.”34 
In conclusion, the constitutional amendment was unnecessary as 
being repetitive because what it added was already in Article 6 of the 
Constitution and also in Article 24 itself, assuming it dealt with 
religious convictions. It is also repetitive because these freedoms 
were already in various international documents that protect human 
rights. 
 
INTERNACIONALES DE DERECHOS HUMANOS: 1776–1976 at 148 (2d ed. 1992). 
 32. Article 18 reads: 
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This 
right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and 
freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to 
adopt a religion or belief of his choice. 
3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, 
health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty 
of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral 
education of their children in conformity with their own convictions. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 18, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 33. This pact is also known as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 12 
reads: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience and of religion. This right includes 
freedom to maintain or to change one’s religion or beliefs, and freedom to profess or 
disseminate one’s religion or beliefs, either individually or together with others, in 
public or in private. 
2. No one shall be subject to restrictions that might impair his freedom to maintain 
or to change his religion or beliefs. 
3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion and beliefs may be subject only to the 
limitations prescribed by law that are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, 
or morals, or the rights or freedoms of others. 
4. Parents or guardians, as the case may be, have the right to provide for the religious 
and moral education of their children or wards that is in accord with their own 
convictions. 
American Convention on Human Rights art. 12, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143. Meanwhile, 
all of Article 13 is dedicated to freedom of thought. Id. at art. 13.  
 34. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 18, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171. 
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F. 
In the context of the discussion concerning international 
documents that protect human rights, it is worth mentioning that if 
we compare the constitutional amendment of Article 24 with any of 
the international documents that protect religious freedom, this 
reform is clearly restrictive by omission since all of the international 
texts provide greater protection of the right to religious freedom and, 
by extension, to other freedoms.35 
There are several aspects in which this legal restriction can be 
observed; however, let us mention only two of these. Article 18 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights clearly states that the 
exercise of religious freedom also includes the ability to change one’s 
religion or belief and that no one may be subjected to restrictive 
measures that impair the freedom to change or maintain one’s 
religion, as is also set forth in the Pact of San José, Costa Rica of 
1969.36 However, this very important aspect of religious freedom is 
not covered by the constitutional amendment. It is true that 
according to progressive interpretation criteria regarding human 
rights, when deciding an issue, the document that provides greater 
protection should be used.37 However, in a legal culture as legalistic 
as is Mexico’s, which has barely begun to have some idea of what 
human rights are and how to protect them through interpreting 
them, it would have been more appropriate to also include the 
freedom to change one’s religion in the discussed amendment, but 
this was not the case. This is another reason why the reform is 
limited and restrictive. 
Another instance where the restrictive spirit of the amendment 
is demonstrated concerns religious education. If the legislature really 
 
 35. For a detailed analysis of the reception that international documents that protect 
human rights have had on religious freedom, see SCHARFFS & DURHAM, supra note 20, at 77–111 
(2010); Javier Martínez-Torrón, La protección internacional de la libertad religiosa, in TRATADO DE 
DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO 141–293 (1994). Information on Javier Martínez-Torrón and his book can 
be found at http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Javier_Mart%C3%ADnez-Torr%C3%B3n. 
 36. According to Article 12, Clause 2, “No one shall be subject to restrictions that might 
impair his freedom to maintain or to change his religion or beliefs.” American Convention on 
Human Rights art. 13, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143. 
 37. Edgar Carpio Marcos, La interpretación de los derechos fundamentales, in 1  
EDUARDO FERRER MAC-GREGOR, INTERPRETACIÓN CONSTITUCIONAL 327 (2005), available at 
http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/publica/rev/cconst/cont/14/rb/rb15.htm. RAMÍREZ GARCÍA, 
HUGO SAÚL & PALLARES YABUR, PEDRO DE JESÚS: DERECHOS HUMANOS 72–73 (2011), available at 
http://libros-revistas-derecho.vlex.es/vid/ramirez-hugo-saul-pallares-yabur-oxford-388246672. 
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intended to enlarge the right of religious freedom, perhaps it would 
have considered that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 
1948, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 
1966, and also the Pact of San José, Costa Rica of 1969 all establish 
that parents or legal guardians have the right to ensure that their 
children receive religious or moral education that is in accordance 
with their own convictions.38 This point is undoubtedly one of the 
most significant human rights, specifically as the right to religious 
freedom is concerned. Many countries recognize this right in their 
legislation,39 but it was simply not mentioned in the constitutional 
reform that was brought about in Mexico. 
Although the original project did indeed contemplate this right 
of parents, the final draft and approval simply did not include it, 
largely due to Jacobean and nineteenth-century ideology that 
continues to weigh heavily on the Mexican political class and is 
almost always defended, even over respect for human rights and the 
commitments that Mexico as a country has acquired through 
approving and signing international documents. From this point of 
view, one can seriously argue that in Mexico there is not a real and 
genuine concern for defending human rights, because when a 
constitutional amendment is introduced that amplifies them, it must 
be accompanied with all its consequences. In this case, this means 
recognizing the right of parents to have their children receive 
religious education that is consistent with their beliefs. 
On this point, one might object by saying that the right of 
parents or guardians to have their children receive religious and 
moral education that is in accordance with their convictions has 
existed in Mexico since the amendment to Article 3 of the 
Constitution that occurred in 1992, which eliminated the prohibition 
of this right. However, we must note that this right actually exists, 
but only for parents and guardians who can send their children to 
 
 38. By way of only one example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
of 1966 states in Article 18, paragraph 4: “The States [/] Parties to the present Covenant 
undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to 
ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own 
convictions.” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 18, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171. 
 39. On this point, see Javier Ferrer Ortiz, Los derechos educativos de los padres en una sociedad 
plural, in EL DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO A LAS PUERTAS DEL SIGLO XXI: LIBRO HOMENAJE AL PROFESOR 
JUAN GOTI ORDEÑANA 125–46 (2006), available at 
http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=2302954. 
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private schools,40 which does not take into account those who send 
their children to public schools. Here, there is clearly religious 
discrimination that cannot be tolerated in a truly democratic system 
of law—one in which there are no first- and second-class citizens—
but the text of the Mexican Constitution currently establishes such 
discrimination.41 
Also, the right that parents now have concerning students in 
private schools was not a right directly enshrined in the 
Constitution, but rather an omission by the legislature concerning 
private education: because religious teaching in private or unofficial 
schools was not prohibited, it was implicitly authorized. As González 
Schmal said, this was treated, “in a certain sense, as a tolerated 
freedom and not a proclaimed freedom. It went from prohibition to 
tolerance, or, if you will, from extralegal tolerance to legal 
tolerance.”42 
In conclusion, the constitutional amendment to Article 24 is 
highly restrictive, limiting, and discriminatory. First, when compared 
with other legal documents—in this case international—the other 
documents recognized a much broader right to religious freedom. 
Next, the amendment is limiting since it did not go further and 
expressly establish the rights of parents to have their children 
receive religious education in accordance with their convictions. And 
it is highly discriminatory because the Mexican legislature wanted to 
continue to maintain that the parents or guardians who could enjoy 
this right were only those whose economic capacity would allow 
them to send their children to private schools. 
 
 40. Section VI of Article 3 of the Mexican Constitution says: “Individual schools may 
provide education in all its types and means. In the terms that the law establishes, the State will 
grant and withdraw official recognition of studies conducted in particular facilities. In the case of 
primary, secondary, and post-secondary education . . . .” Constitución Política de los Estados 
Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, art. 3, sec. VI, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de 
Febrero de 1917 (Mex.). 
 41. On this point, see ALBERTO PATIÑO, LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA Y PRINCIPIO DE COOPERACIÓN 
EN HISPANOAMÉRICA 102–03 (2011). 
 42. RAÚL GONZÁLEZ SCHMAL, DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO MEXICANO: UN MARCO PARA LA 
LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA 221 (1997). On the same subject of the right of parents, see Sandra Cecilia 
García Aguirre, La libertad de enseñanza, in ANTONIO MOLINA MELIÁ, LAS LIBERTADES RELIGIOSAS: 
DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO MEXICANO 213–18 (1997). 
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G. 
Another very important issue that the Mexican doctrine has 
often stressed, related to the amendment’s restrictive effect,43 is the 
reductionist spirit of the announced amendment. After careful 
observation, it can be noted that the exercise of religious freedom is 
reduced to only one of its manifestations: expression of worship. 
After establishing that everyone has the right to freedom of 
religion (a misnomer because it should have been that of religious 
freedom), the relevant part of Article 24 states: “This freedom 
includes the right to participate, individually or collectively, publicly 
or privately, in the corresponding ceremonies, devotions, or acts of 
worship . . . .”44 
With this language, the Mexican legislature reduced the right to 
religious freedom to only freedom of worship, but it must be 
remembered that this expression does not just concern a singular 
manner of living and expressing religious beliefs. In fact, there are 
other ways by which one can express the right to religious freedom. 
Among these we can mention religious professions, religious 
education, religious outreach, etc. Why reduce religious freedom to a 
single manifestation when there are many more ways to express this 
freedom? 
Concerning this point, one of the most prominent Mexican 
theorists on religious freedom said: “It appears that the problem and 
the need of those who promoted the amendment was not to 
recognize the right of religious freedom in its many facets, but only 
one in particular—religious worship—as if it was not already 
contained in the often-cited article 24 of the Constitution.”45 
Thus, the problem is that for the national legislature, religious 
freedom is reduced solely to religious worship. This poses 
particularly serious problems because it restricts protection of a very 
broad right to one of its facets: worship, whether in public or private. 
The Mexican legislature missed an opportunity to expand 
governmental respect for and recognition of religious freedom and to 
make it inclusive of important issues such as religious proselytism, 
 
 43. González, supra note 26, at 36–37. 
 44. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, art. 24, 
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.). 
 45. Raúl González Schmal, Comentarios sobre la reforma al artículo 24 constitucional, in 
REFORMAS AL 24 CONSTITUCIONAL, CUATRO ENFOQUES 9 (2012). 
DO NOT DELETE 1/29/2014 10:02 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2013 
572 
religious marriage, spiritual aid, health, etc., through which the right 
to religious freedom is manifested. 
The conclusion to this seventh argument seems clear. The right 
to religious freedom and the way in which this freedom is 
manifested is broader and therefore much richer than the mere 
expression of it through worship. Using this expression-based 
description exhibited the legislature’s missed opportunity to extend 
the scope of protection of this right. Consequently, it can be said 
that this is a reductionist amendment. 
H. 
There is another aspect that national doctrine has often stressed 
and that was unfortunately not sufficiently contemplated in the 
amendment of Article 24. This has to do with the broad discretion 
that public authorities have, which could restrict the right of 
religious freedom. 
In relevant part, the amendment states that the freedom of 
ethical convictions, conscience, and religion includes the right to 
participate, either individually or collectively, in public or private, in 
ceremonies, devotions, and acts of worship, “provided they do not 
constitute a crime or offense punishable by law.”46 And it then 
establishes that “[n]o one may use public acts of exercise of this 
freedom for political purposes, for proselytizing, or for political 
propaganda.”47 
It may be useful to point out an important distinction about 
when we face a crime and when we face an offense and, most 
importantly, what is the attitude of the authority concerning both 
acts. Obviously, if an action is characterized as a crime in the 
respective penal code, authorities only have authority to punish the 
offender or offenders, whether or not (1) they were motivated by 
their religious beliefs and/or (2) they were expressing a religious 
conviction. Such application of the law leaves little uncertainty, but 
will the result be so clear when the text of the Article refers to not 
only crimes but also to offenses? It appears that it will not because, 
among other reasons, this term is not very clear in national 
legislation, thus opening the possibility for authorities—mainly 
 
 46. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, art. 24, 
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.). 
 47. Id. 
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administrative authorities—to establish any kind of punishment for 
what it deems to be an offense. 
Concerning this, Jorge Adame wrote: 
There is no doubt that the act of worship cannot be a crime under 
the law (assuming the legislature classifies as crimes those that 
actually are crimes, since it has in the past classified certain acts as 
crimes, simply due to hatred of religion, acts of worship that in no 
way offend common good), but it is too much to say that persons 
cannot perform acts of worship involv[ing] an administrative 
“offense,” which opens the doors for the government to restrict the 
observance of acts of worship. So, the defect that the current article 
already had is not overcome; rather, the project reiterates it.48 
More serious consequences come from the latter part of the 
constitutional reform; it left to the respective authorities’ free will to, 
for example, assess any demonstration that may have the appearance 
of being expressed with political purposes by any religious 
representative. It was obvious that the target of this part of the 
constitutional reform is the Catholic Church and some of its 
representatives, who clearly have opposed legislation that threatens 
not only their religious ideology, but also the most basic human 
rights. Is this the way that the rights of religious freedom in a 
pluralistic society are properly protected? We must state things 
clearly and free ourselves of hypocrisy. In a state of law, religious 
faiths have complete authority to express their views on social 
issues, including, of course, political issues such as pro-choice or 
pro-euthanasia laws, especially since implementing those laws 
threatens human rights. 
But limitations on and violations of the right to religious 
freedom do not end here, but extend and intensify due to this 
reform. Given that the freedom at issue includes the freedom of 
ethical convictions, conscience, and religion, all these freedoms and 
their eventual manifestations should be careful to avoid political 
issues and campaigning for or against any propaganda. This would 
further open the doors to the already broad and arbitrary power that 
authorities have to punish any religious organization or any of its 
representatives. 
Do not think that these concerns are unfounded or that they 
view reality inaccurately. There have been cases where authorities 
 
 48. Goddard, supra note 14, at 17–18. 
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have voided political elections simply because the candidate of a 
party, in his capacity as a parishioner (as could any citizen), attended 
Mass to start his campaign. Is this an “offense” severe enough to 
have voided the respective elections? According to the respective 
authorities, it proved to be a more than sufficient reason to nullify 
the respective election and take the victory from the winning 
candidate.49 
Other examples also demonstrate the danger of the broad and 
arbitrary discretion of the respective authorities. Serious prejudices 
were suffered by priests in any State of the Republic who read in 
their respective masses a pastoral document sent by their bishop that 
asked the congregation to carefully consider which candidate to vote 
for in the elections that Sunday. The document reminded them that 
as Catholics, they should be in favor of the right to life, but it did not 
specifically mention the political party that had used this as its 
campaign slogan.50 
In the same sense, we must not forget the strong financial 
penalty imposed on a candidate for governor of a state for campaign 
meetings that were held with evangelical groups, or for the act of 
simply invoking God, saying, “I will win with the support of the will 
of the people and of God.”51 Is this the religious freedom that the 
exclaimed constitutional amendment seeks to expand and protect? 
Since this is not clear, absurd results could ensue from thinking 
that neither the freedom of ethical convictions (in the event that we 
considered it a right), nor the freedom of conscience, much less 
religious freedom, can be expressed with political ends, when it is 
part of the nature of these freedoms to express one’s self on political 
or social issues of all kinds (except those that have to do with 
partisan propaganda directly). Under this belief, not only can priests 
and parishioners of religious associations not express themselves for 
political purposes, but neither can any citizen who, protected by the 
freedom of conscience or ethical convictions, wants to do so.52 Is 
 
 49. See Javier Saldaña Serrano, Estándares internacionales en materia de libertad religiosa y 
resoluciones del Poder Judicial de la Federación (México), in SENTENCIAS DE LA SUPREMA CORTE DE 
JUSTICIA DE LA NACIÓN DESDE EL ANÁLISIS DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS 415–17 (2011), available at 
http://www.hchr.org.mx/files/doctos/Libros/Sentencias_dela_SCJN_desdeel_an%C3%A1lisis_d
elos_DH.pdf. 
 50. See id. at 417–18. 
 51. Id. at 418–20. 
 52. Concerning this, D. Raúl González Schmal said: 
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there not a wide margin of discretion for authorities to punish 
religious persons or organizations? 
Thus, we can conclude that this reform grants an enormous 
amount of discretion to authorities to determine when to punish a 
religious association or its representatives, upon determining that it 
has committed an offense or has carried out manifestations for 
political ends. In the author’s opinion, these instruments add to the 
long list that the Mexican legislature established to limit the right to 
religious freedom. 
I. 
Another issue that is seen in the reform in question is the 
inclusion of a relatively new term in the Mexican constitutional 
culture of human rights: the recognition of the “freedom of 
conscience.” 
Obviously, this freedom is much more familiar to us than that of 
ethical convictions; it is often mentioned in international human 
rights documents alongside the freedoms of thought and religion.53 
However, there are some critical issues that should be discussed 
concerning its inclusion in the Constitution. First, what does the 
freedom of conscience mean as a human right? And, above all, what 
did the Mexican legislature understand freedom of conscience to 
mean when it included it in the Constitution? We have already said 
 
This prohibition seriously violates, prejudicing the public, not only the right of 
religious freedom enshrined in the terms of Article 24, which was intended to be 
reformed, but also the right to freedom of expression, oral and written information, 
and assembly, rights enshrined in Articles 6, 7, and 9 respectively of the Basic Law. 
And, even more, following the same purpose of the uncompromising minority of the 
lawmakers to exploit the reform to minimize the right of religious freedom, the 
discussed paragraph is more restrictive than Article 130 of the Constitution, which 
deals with political rights. In effect, a subsection of Article 130 says that ministers of 
religion cannot, among other things, “preach in favor of or against any political 
candidate, party, or association.” It also adds, “Neither may they oppose the laws of 
the country or its institutions, nor insult patriotic symbols in any form, in public 
meetings, acts of the sect, or religious literature.” 
Now, in the initiated reform of 24, this prohibition is included, not only to ministers 
but to all citizens who use “public acts of exercise of this freedom with political 
purposes, for proselytizing, or for political propaganda.” 
Schmal, supra note 45, at 10. 
 53. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 18, Dec. 16, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion.”). 
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something concerning this when we discussed the issue of 
characterizing these rights,54 but now we develop this point a little 
more. 
In the doctrinal context of human rights, freedom of conscience 
refers to the judgments of reason about the good or bad of human 
acts through which the conscience is formed. Thus, for example, 
Professor Javier Hervada states the following: 
Conscience is the opinion or judgment of practical reason of the 
person about the morality of an action that will be made, is being 
made, or has been made. It deals with, therefore, a judgment about 
the morality of singular and concrete actions that are presented as a 
possibility, something being done, or something already done.55 
Thus, that which is protected by the freedom of conscience is 
“acting in good conscience; that is, it is a double freedom to act 
according to the dictates of conscience and not be forced or 
compelled to act against conscience.”56 
Accordingly, it is clear that the formation of such judgments of 
practical reason—that is, of one’s conscience—applies to individuals 
and to nobody else. Did the Mexican legislature understand this in 
this way? Hopefully, yes. It would be problematic to incorporate the 
freedom of conscience as a form by which political powers could 
influence the formation of the consciousness of the people; the 
situation would become sensitive because that power cannot dictate 
how we do or do not form our conscience, but can simply prevent 
wrongful acts. 
This interpretation, that for some could be a windmill57 or, in 
other words, something unreal at this point when reflecting on the 
human rights in the world, is not so unreal when we review our 
 
 54. See supra Part II. 
 55. Hervada, Libertad de conciencia, supra note 13, at 43. 
 56. HERVADA, LOS ECLESIASTICISTAS, supra note 13, at 222. It must also be said that there 
is a whole school of thought that believes that freedom of conscience means an ideological 
freedom, that is, the possibility of having a particular worldview. See, e.g., P. Talavera, 
Conscientious Health Objection in the Prison Environment, 12 REV ESP SANID PENIT 27, 29 (2010), 
available at http://scielo.isciii.es/pdf/sanipe/v12n1/en_05_especial1.pdf (quoting a Spanish 
Constitutional Court Sentence that said “given the fact that freedom of conscience is, in turn, a 
specification of ideological freedom . . . it can be said that conscientious objection is a right 
acknowledged both in an explicit and implicit way by Spanish Constitutional Legislation”). 
 57. Miguel de Cervantes famously wrote about Don Quixote who attacked windmills that 
he believed to be ferocious giants. MIGUEL DE CERVANTES SAAVEDRA, DON QUIJOTE 60–61 (Edith 
Grossman trans., HarperCollins Publishers Inc. 2003) (1605, 1615). 
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national history. One need only recall the imposition of an 
ideological approach like that of the “secularism” in the education 
provided by the State—far removed from any fanaticism and 
prejudice and currently set forth in the Constitution itself—to help 
us realize that this is not so unreal. This is reminiscent of the 
imposition of socialist education that Lazaro Cardenas promoted and 
that characterized the education imparted by the State for a long 
time.58 
Now, if the meaning of freedom of conscience is identified along 
with freedom of religion, and the latter is understood as a kind of 
ideological freedom (as is understood by some parts of the 
doctrine),59 this would result in unnecessary repetition because the 
ideology of a person and the ability to express this ideology is 
already covered by the freedom of thought in Article 6 of the 
Constitution, as previously explained. 
In line with what has previously been discussed, the obvious 
question then is: which of the two meanings is the one that the 
Mexican Constitution now protects? If the answer is that the 
meaning of freedom of conscience refers to the formation of personal 
conscience by political powers, then we would be before a 
paternalism that today nobody supports and is absolutely rejected. 
Now, if the answer relates to the second meaning, which is that the 
freedom of conscience is a kind of ideological freedom, then this is 
repetitive. Which is the correct definition? 
Finally, it must be noted, as Jorge Adame pointed out, that if the 
recognition of freedom of conscience was approved in the given 
terms, a right that accompanies that freedom should have been 
incorporated, such as the freedom of conscientious objection, which 
does not appear anywhere.60 A right as fundamental as the freedom 
of conscience needs to be protected in all its dimensions, the main 
 
 58. For a description of Cardenas’ socialist education policies, see Mary Kay Vaughan, 
The Educational Project of the Mexican Revolution: The Response of Local Societies, in MOLDING THEIR 
HEARTS AND MINDS: EDUCATION, COMMUNICATIONS, AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA 105, 
108–09 (John A. Britton ed., 1997). 
 59. See Javier Saldaña Serrano, Carbonell, Miguel, La libertad religiosa en la Constitución 
mexicana (artículos 24 y 130), Documento de Trabajo, in 12 CUESTIONES CONSTITUTIONALES 319 
(2005), available at http://ojs.unam.mx/index.php/cuc/article/download/2138/1700; see also 
DIONISIO LLAMAZARES FERNÁNDEZ, DERECHO DE LA LIBERTAD DE CONCIENCIA (5th ed. 2004), 
available at http://www.casadellibro.com/libro-derecho-eclesiastico-del-estado-5-
ed/9788434430754/984132. 
 60. Goddard, supra note 14, at 16. 
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dimension being that there is the possibility that people may reject a 
claim imposed by law when it goes against their deepest values or 
most deeply rooted convictions.61 This right simply does not appear 
in the constitutional reform, which confirms that the Mexican 
legislature was not interested in broadening the right of freedom of 
conscience. 
Thus, one can conclude that while recognizing the good of 
including freedom of conscience, this was not entirely spelled out 
nor sufficiently protected. Issues such as conscientious objection 
simply were not introduced, thus implying a half-finished reform. 
J. 
A final comment must be made, which deals specifically with the 
inclusion of the term “secular,” by which the Mexican Republic must 
qualify and identify itself, in Article 40 of the Constitution.62 
It must first be established that within the most specialized 
doctrine exists a perfectly clear differentiation between the principles 
of “separation” of church and state and “secularism” (each with its 
own characteristics).63 Nevertheless, according to the Mexican 
mentality—especially according to the Freemason-Jacobin 
mentality—secularism has always been understood, in the best of 
cases, as the absolute separation between political powers and the 
churches and, in the worst of cases, as the State’s ability to pursue 
and attack any form of religious expression in society, mainly that 
which comes from the Catholic Church. The first understanding 
does not even encompass the term “positive secularism,”64 and is 
purely and simply separation of state. The second is a negative 
 
 61. For more on this subject, see DORA MARÍA SIERRA MADERO, LA OBJECIÓN DE 
CONCIENCIA EN MÉXICO: BASES PARA UN ADECUADO MARCO JURÍDICO (2012), available at 
http://biblio.juridicas.unam.mx/libros/7/3083/pl3083.htm. 
 62. See Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, art. 40, 
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.). 
 63. See Pedro Juan Viladrich, Los principios informadores del derecho eclesiástico español, in 
DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO DEL ESTADO ESPAÑOL 169–260 (2nd ed. 1983); Joaquín Calvo-Álvarez, La 
presencia de los principios informadores del derecho eclesiástico español en las sentencias del Tribunal 
Constitucional, in TRATADO DE DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO 243–318 (1994). 
 64. For an analysis of positive secularism, see Isidoro Martín Sánchez, La laicidad positiva 
y su reflejo en los estados miembros de la Unión Europea, in EL DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO A LAS PUERTAS 
DEL SIGLO XXI: LIBRO HOMENAJE AL PROFESOR JUAN GOTI ORDEÑANA 273 (2006), available at 
http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=2379096. 
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secularism, typical of dictatorial regimes that violate human rights.65 
Which is the real meaning that was intended in the constitutional 
reform by the expression “secular”? The Mexican experience allows 
us to believe that the second meaning is the one that the Mexican 
legislature seems to have had in mind when it included this term in 
the Constitution. 
There are plenty of arguments that lead one to believe that this is 
true, if we consider the meaning of secularism to be one of 
separation. Moreover, persecution was already established in Article 
130 of the Constitution, which begins: “The historic principle of 
separation of the State and the churches guides the standards 
presented in the present article. Churches and other religious 
organizations shall be organized under the law.”66 The next sentence 
reads: “It is the exclusive responsibility of the Congress of the Union 
to legislate in matters of public denominations, churches, and 
religious organizations.”67 
Now, if what was intended was to emphasize the criterion of 
secularism of the Republic, it would have been desirable for the 
legislators to return to see what they themselves approved at the 
time in the Law on Religious Associations and Public Worship, in 
which Article 3 expressly states: “The Mexican State is secular. The 
same shall exercise authority over all religious activity, individual or 
collective.”68 What purpose then was there in putting this in the 
Constitution? None. It was an unnecessary, repetitive, and 
superficial inclusion that can only be understood from the 
imposition of a nineteenth-century, regressive, and persecutory 
ideology, typical of those who do not want to understand what is a 
true State of law, respectful of human rights and particularly the 
right to religious freedom. 
Moreover, it may be useful to draw attention to what the text of 
Article 3 of the Law states, since it is the State and not the Republic 
who is defined as secular, as is expressly stated in the current Article 
 
 65. See ANDRÉS OLLERO TASSARA, LAICIDAD Y LAICISMO 93–124 (2010), available at 
http://www.fcjs.urjc.es/departamentos/areas/profesores/p3.asp?id=rzvyxtxwx. 
 66. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, art. 130, 
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Ley de Asociaciones Religiosas y Culto Público [Law on Religious Associations and 
Public Worship], art. 3, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 15 de Julio de 1992 (Mex.) 
(emphasis added), available at http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/24.pdf. 
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40 of the Federal Constitution.69 This obviously reflects the low 
technical level of the Mexican political class who does not know how 
to distinguish between a form of a socio-political organization and a 
form of government. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Having identified various conclusions at the end of each 
respective argument that was presented, we refer the reader to these 
respective sections. 
However, the author would like to finish with what D. Raúl 
González Schmal stressed, concerning the “enthusiastic” 
participation of our legislators in the constitutional reform. The less-
than-lively turnout deserves to be highlighted. In the Chamber of 
Deputies, only 260 of the 500 deputies were present, from which 
199 voted in favor, 58 voted against, and 3 abstained.70 This shows 
the low standard of the Mexican legislators and the little interest 
that such a fundamental right like religious freedom arouses in 
them. 
 
 
 69. In this regard Gerardo Cruz González says, “But the adjective ‘secular’ is not a form of 
government but a secondary feature like others: multi-ethnic, inclusive, supportive, multi-
religious, pacifist, non-discriminatory, etc. ‘Secular’ is not a form of government, nor is it a legal 
principle, but religious.” González, supra note 26, at 38. 
 70. Raúl González Schmal, Comentarios sobre la reforma al artículo 24 constitucional, in 
REFORMAS AL 24 CONSTITUCIONAL, CUATRO ENFOQUES 9 (2012). 
